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Introduction
It is not very often that the leader of a political party 
publicly admits his team got it wrong, but that is exactly 
what David Cameron, the leader of the Conservative 
Party in the United Kingdom, has recently done. In his 
manifesto-like paper ‘The Permissive Society’ (2006), in 
which he outlines his thinking on a new social philosophy, 
Cameron discusses the apparently sorry state of local 
government and comments that ‘there is a renewed 
need for greater local fi scal autonomy and for strong 
civic institutions’. In discussing how this need arose he 
further notes, refl ecting on the Conservatives’ last period 
in offi ce, that ‘we Conservatives must accept our share of 
the blame’ (Cameron and Spelman, 2006, p.7)
Mr Cameron’s road to Damascus experience is associated 
with the Sustainable Communities Bill, an initiative 
intended to provide communities with a greater say 
about how public resources are allocated in their cities 
and districts. The bill, which is a private members’ 
bill, was introduced into the House of Commons 
in November 2006 with the active support of the 
Conservatives, the Social Democrats and a signifi cant 
number of Labour MPs. If enacted it could radically 
reshape the centralised nature of the British polity.
The Sustainable Communities Bill
Having begun its with a call from the Social Democrats 
for greater devolution,1 the Sustainable Communities 
Bill sets out to give communities a greater say over 
the way in which government spending within their 
boundaries is allocated and prioritised. The bill allows 
communities, through their local authorities, to require 
the secretary of state to provide a ‘local communities 
account’ for their area. This account sets out, as far as 
practicable, the amount government departments and 
agencies are planning to spend on services in the relevant 
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local authority area, as well as identifying individual 
proposals to which money has already been allocated. 
Spending plans are required to cover a four-year period 
and must be provided within three months of any 
request. Services of national signifi cance, which are to 
be defi ned in advance, are excluded from the process.2 
Having received its local communities account, a series of 
duties are imposed on the local authority. These include:
• to prepare, within six months, a spending plan 
containing a range of proposed services and projects 
that will benefi t its communities;
• to give public notice of its intention to prepare a 
spending plan and invite representatives from a 
variety of local ‘peak’ organisations to take part in 
the preparation of the plan;
• to make the plan available for public inspection.
The local authority must also ensure that the plan 
contributes to the sustainability of communities, while 
taking into account the government’s action plan for 
sustainable communities. On completion, local spending 
plans are submitted to the secretary of state, who must then 
approve them, with or without amendments, within three 
months. If a local spending plan is amended, the secretary 
of state must publish a statement explaining the reasons for 
the changes. The secretary of state must also:
• monitor the implementation of the plans by 
government departments;
• provide an annual report to parliament on the 
implementation of such plans; and
• direct, if necessary, a government agency to 
implement the plans.
1 Guardian Unlimited, 3 November 2006.
2  To reduce ‘game playing’ the secretary of state must justify why any 
service classed as ‘national’ has been given that classifi cation.
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In addition, the bill requires the secretary of state, within two 
years of enactment, to publish an action plan to promote 
the sustainability of local communities. This plan must 
have a ten-year focus, contain a range of local and general 
measures, and invite local authorities to comment. Any 
local authority that wishes to make representations must 
have given its citizens, including youth and marginalised 
communities, an opportunity to comment on the content 
of the action plan before such representations are made. 
The bill makes provision for the secretary of state to initiate 
revisions of both local communities’ accounts and the 
action plan for sustainable communities. 
The bill is framed in both sustainability and localist terms, 
and represents an interesting challenge to the centralised 
nature of the British polity. Its endorsement of a kind 
of participatory budgeting treats citizen participation 
and engagement as having more than just instrumental 
value. While engaged individuals and groups taking a 
more active say in the way their local environments 
are shaped and resources allocated may contribute to 
sustainability, participation also has substantive value, 
not only helping to ensure that government spending 
is well targeted but also strengthening communities, 
building social capital and enhancing trust in public 
institutions. The bill, by allowing local citizens and their 
representatives to comment on and effectively supplant 
the allocation decisions of government departments, 
addresses a range of public policy issues that are not 
confi ned to the United Kingdom. These include:
• the information problems faced by national decision 
makers and their advisers when attempting to design 
services and programmes for communities which are 
becoming increasingly diverse;
• the problem of providing contestable advice on 
whether or not proposed spending plans are relevant 
and appropriate for the targeted communities;
• the challenge of increasing the responsiveness of 
government departments and agencies by providing 
an additional mechanism through which the clients 
and consumers of the services provided by those 
departments and agencies can exercise voice and 
express their views to decsion makers;
• a method for addressing the problem of silos by 
subjecting departmental spending plans to greater 
public scrutiny in a manner that can highlight gaps 
and duplication, potentially a form of ‘joining up’.
In summary, the bill not only provides a way of dealing 
with what we might call the problem of centralisation; 
it also shifts to a more citizen-oriented form of politics, 
something approaching a co-production model. While 
the bill is unlikely to succeed, at least in its original form, 
it provides an interesting approach to achieving increased 
responsiveness to local diversity while still allowing the 
state to exercise a national mandate. In effect it proposes 
what Sir Michael Lyons has described in his inquiry report 
as a state of ‘managed difference’ (Lyons, 2007).
The United Kingdom context
The United Kingdom represents one of the more 
centralised states within the OECD. but it has 
not always been that way. In the past British local 
government was amongst the most autonomous in 
Europe, but while the role and function of European 
local government has advanced, the UK has suffered a 
reversal and experienced a ‘consistent erosion of local 
government powers and responsibilities’ (Banner, 
2002, p.218). Arguably, this decline was halted by 
the election of New Labour in 1997 and its embrace 
of a range of modernisation strategies to revitalise 
local politics, for example the Best Practice Regime, 
Strategic Local Partnerships, Local Area Agreements, 
Compulsory Performance Assessments (CPA) and 
directly-elected mayors. It has even experimented with 
regional assemblies and the idea of ‘double devolution’ 
or devolution to neighbourhoods.3 Modernisation, 
however, does not necessarily refl ect a consistent move 
towards greater locality empowerment, despite the 
rhetoric. Stoker (2002) argues that the government 
has adopted a conscious ‘policy as lottery’ approach to 
reform in which local government is used as a laboratory 
to try out a range of random initiatives with a view to 
seeing which ones might take root and fl ower. While 
the emphasis has been placed on responsiveness and 
effi ciency, the government has not yet embraced the level 
of devolution desired by many in the local government 
sector, such as the Local Government Association. As 
of early 2007, local government rates were still capped, 
business rates were taken by the Treasury4 and councils 
were subject to annual compulsory performance audits 
with targets set by Whitehall. Cameron argues that 
3 Ironically, since consolidation in the UK, councils are now regarded 
as too distant from communities to be effective models of local 
democracy, therefore the need for double devolution.
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the national inspection regime is now costing councils 
more than one billion pounds per annum (Cameron 
and Spelman, 2006, p.9). 
Not surprisingly, alternative narratives have developed 
that aim to give greater voice to communities and 
autonomy to councils. Since the late 90s the debate 
has become framed by the concept of ‘new localism’, 
a concept promoted in a paper produced by the New 
Local Government Network entitled Towards a New 
Localism (Filkin et al., 2000). The idea of new localism 
challenges the notion that councils are in essence service 
providers for the Crown, and argues the need to restore 
the legitimacy of local public services, strong local 
leadership and greater responsiveness. To that degree it 
merges much of the modernisation agenda endorsed by 
New Labour, particularly its emphasis on accountability 
and performance, with the more traditional localist 
concerns of autonomy, self-management and place. The 
vision advanced by the new localists is one in which 
local authorities have a strong and popular democratic 
mandate to represent and promote the well-being of 
citizens, as opposed to the alternative functionalist 
interpretation of local government’s role. 
The local authority should be the guardian of 
the public realm, the champion and protector 
of consumers, the supporter of social citizenship 
goals and of civic society and the promoter of the 
economic and social health of the community 
and of inclusive and cohesive communities. 
(Filkin et al., 2000, p.7)
The localist agenda has also been taken up by the 
national organisations of local government, although 
with some qualifi cations. The chief executive of the 
Local Government Association, Sir Brian Briscoe, 
argued that the opportunity had to be seized to ‘establish 
councils as the champions of localism, and to reaffi rm 
their role in securing local democratic accountability 
of public services’.5 Briscoe, however, also expressed 
concern that the new localist brand was in danger of 
being used to undermine the intent of its supporters and 
to ‘take the politics out of local government’,6 an oblique 
reference to the growing enthusiasm for networks and 
other forms of joined-up governance that have oblique 
forms of accountability (Bound et al., 2005). 
The idea of new localism has set the context for the 
emergence of the Sustainable Communities Bill. 
While supporters of the bill may have one eye on the 
forthcoming general election, its recognition of the 
new localist agenda, the role it gives to communities 
of place and the opportunities it provides for citizen 
participation, not to mention its anti-centralisation 
rhetoric, appear to resonate with a wide audience. 
Yet will it resonate in the New Zealand context? Is 
the New Zealand electorate ready for a ‘down under’ 
brand of new localism? Certainly, the lack of any clearly 
articulated devolutionary viewpoint within the New 
Zealand parliament doesn’t augur well so far.
Is the Sustainable Communities Bill 
relevant to New Zealand?
Given the disparity in population and size, one might 
be forgiven for assuming that a citizen-centred approach 
to public decision making would have a considerably 
greater chance of success in New Zealand than in the 
United Kingdom; however, it is worth considering not 
only the differences but also the similarities between the 
two systems. The British system of local government 
is characterised by high levels of national funding 
(more than 50% of council income is provided by 
the state), centrally-determined performance targets 
and rate capping, all of which create constraints that 
are not present in New Zealand, where councils have 
considerably more political and fi nancial autonomy 
(approximately 11% of income is provided by the state). 
Councils in the United Kingdom play a major role in the 
provision of social and community services, in essence 
acting as agents of the Crown, while councils in New 
Zealand have a narrow range of mandatory functions 
and social services are delivered by the centre. Despite 
their differences, a common feature of both systems is 
the degree to which major policy and funding decisions 
are made by the departments and agencies of central 
government, despite the role councils in the United 
Kingdom play in the delivery of those services. Both 
are examples of highly centralised polities.7 
4 The government re-distributes a proportion of the business tax back 
to councils on the basis of a formula.
5  Local Government Chronicle, 17 April 2003.
6 Ibid.
7  With perhaps the exception being the Resource Management Act 
1991, which devolves a considerable (but diminishing) level of 
autonomy for environmental management to local government in 
New Zealand.
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Two other features of New Zealand’s institutional 
landscape may be relevant to the discussion: the 
centralisation of government offi ces in the capital (many 
councils have no government offi ces permanently based 
in their areas, other than the New Zealand Police), and 
the largely non-party political nature of our councils. 
The centralisation of government administration 
and the degree to which implementation is carried 
out through contract weakens the ability of the state 
to respond to local circumstances. The lack of staff 
‘on the ground’ means that many departments have 
less direct information about community needs and 
preferences and are forced to rely on the views of third 
parties or the analysis technical data. A model like the 
Sustainable Communities Bill can fi ll the void left by 
the withdrawal of government offi ces. It might also act 
to fi ll the information gap created by the lack of a ‘party 
politics’ at the local level in New Zealand. 
British local government is a microcosm of the national 
political landscape, with councils under the political 
control of local branches of national political parties. 
As with local government in Ireland, overlapping 
membership creates networks and informal channels 
through which councillors can both infl uence policy 
and exercise voice at the national level. The role of 
‘party politics’ is so entrenched that even the UK Local 
Government Association is organised along national 
party political lines.8 In contrast, the lack of any formal 
political presence by major parties in New Zealand local 
government effectively diminishes one of the potential 
channels through which localities might influence 
central policy makers. A Sustainable Communities Bill is 
one way of fi lling this gap. Of course, overlapping party 
membership of the UK type can also have the perverse 
effect of constraining local autonomy and limiting local 
dissent, in the interest of party unity.
The Sustainable Communities Bill addresses a core 
public policy issue about the appropriate role of the 
centre in determining policy and service priorities in 
local communities. The question, simply put, is how to 
design institutions and processes that allow governments 
to achieve their welfare objectives while recognising 
and accounting for community difference, difference 
that includes ethnicity, culture, social and economic 
conditions and, of course, preferences? Parker and 
O’Leary, in their work on the New Zealand public 
sector, note that governments are increasingly dealing 
with complex or ‘messy’ problems, which are problems 
that are not amenable to traditional solutions: ‘One 
size fi ts all solutions can alienate staff and produce 
unintended consequences by failing to engage with 
the complexity of peoples’ needs’ (Parker and O’Leary, 
2006, p.29). The Sustainable Communities Bill offers a 
particular solution to this problem by providing for the 
participation of citizens in public policy making and is 
consistent with Considine’s view that such participation 
has both instrumental and developmental benefi ts: 
instrumental, in that citizens will provide information 
that can improve policy making, and developmental 
because the process of participation itself contributes 
to social capital and ‘creates and communicates moral 
principles [that] express personal and group needs’ 
(Considine, 2005, p.192). 
The idea that citizen participation strengthens public 
policy making is not new. Apart from being one of the 
underpinning values of local government’s empowering 
legislation, it has also infl uenced recent thinking about 
public management reform. One of the criticisms of 
New Zealand’s approach to public sector reform was 
that too much attention was focused on outputs at 
the expense of their effects on citizens, and that the 
enhanced Wellington-based policy making capacity 
that resulted undermined the role of the community in 
policy design and service delivery specifi cations (Ryan, 
2003). The Review of the Centre (SSC, 2001) addressed 
this concern and rejected a ‘one size fi ts all’ approach in 
service delivery, preferring ‘local customized responses 
within national strategic frameworks and an emphasis 
on participation and state/civil society relationships’ 
(Ryan, 2003, p.15). More recently, Parker and O’Leary 
have noted the importance of involving citizens in 
governance as a way of addressing the complexity of 
life in the 21st century and, as they put it, ‘learning 
how to create more outcome value for citizens without 
sacrifi cing the values of fairness, transparency, integrity 
or independence’ (Parker and O’Leary, 2006, p.14): 
an approach that fi ts rather well with Lyons’ idea of 
‘managed difference’ noted above.
A New Zealand version of the Sustainable Communities 
Bill, with its enhanced opportunities for local advocacy, 
would not only reinforce the solutions proposed in 
8 The president of the association is selected from the party that 
controls the most councils.
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the Review of the Centre, but also complement the 
outcome-focused planning regime introduced by the 
Local Government Act 2002 (LGA 2002). The LGA 
2002 requires councils to facilitate a process to identify 
community outcomes at least once every six years and to 
prepare long term council community plans (LTCCPs) 
every three years. Community outcomes represent the 
desired long-term expectations of communities of place. 
LTCCPs are required to explain to the community how 
the council will contribute to the achievement of those 
outcomes and may also include information on how 
other sectors will also contribute. The government was 
quite specifi c and saw the outcomes process as a way 
of promoting and guiding ‘the setting of priorities in 
relation to the activities of the local authority and other 
organisations’ (LGA 2002, s91(2)(e)). In other words, 
articulated community outcomes should not only guide 
the activities of councils, they should also assist other 
agencies, including government departments, to set 
locally appropriate targets and ultimately better align 
their policies and programmes.
By the end of June 2006 councils had completed their 
fi rst full LTCCPs, for the 2006–2016 period. Although 
the quality and scope of this fi rst tranche of LTCCPs 
probably reflected an over-emphasis on legislative 
compliance, a number of councils sought to use their 
plans, and the information gathered through their 
community engagement processes, to align central 
government programmes with locally determined 
outcomes. New Plymouth District Council, for 
example, used its LTCCP to show how government 
departments contribute to the region’s outcomes, while 
Rangitikei, a rural authority without any government 
departments based in its district, took a particularly 
novel approach. Wishing to engage with departments 
and public agencies during the preparation of its LTCCP, 
the council organised a workshop in Wellington and 
invited relevant departments to attend in order to brief 
them on the district’s priorities and needs. The workshop 
was well attended by government representatives and 
regarded by the council as an important fi rst step in 
addressing the unique concerns of that district.9 Having 
identifi ed their communities’ outcomes, councils are 
now well placed to initiate strategic conversations with 
central government agencies on strategies, programmes 
and projects to facilitate their achievement.10 Likewise, 
they are well placed to contribute to the model envisaged 
by the Sustainable Communities Bill, which requires 
information on local priorities to work. The caveat on 
this proposition is the quality and inclusiveness of the 
processes which councils have employed to identify 
outcomes and establish priorities, something that is 
addressed in the detail of the bill but which is not as 
well prescribed in the LGA 2002.
The process of implementing the LGA 2002 has given 
local authorities in New Zealand the information and 
experience to contribute to the sort of process envisaged 
in the Sustainable Communities Bill, and many would 
enthusiastically embrace the model it proposes in 
preference to the voluntary collaborative approach 
inherent within the LGA 2002, where the involvement 
of government departments and agencies is ultimately 
at the whim of senior management. Encouraging 
citizen-oriented decision making within a sustainable 
communities framework has the potential to promote 
policy learning and innovation as well as increasing 
trust in the political processes of government. Trust 
comes from the transparency achieved by ‘opening up’ 
departments’ discretionary spending decisions to local 
scrutiny, something local authorities themselves are well 
used to. Greater openness should bring government 
closer to the people, an objective around which there 
should be substantial political consensus. It may also 
provide decision makers within the government with 
access to alternative sources of policy advice. 
Inevitably, some local authorities will see the proposal as 
yet a further impost, another unfunded mandate, and 
be reluctant to participate. While it would be foolish 
to underestimate opposition on these grounds, it is 
interesting to note how the architects of the Sustainable 
Communities Bill have attempted to guard against such 
risks by refusing to make the requirement mandatory on 
local government. As long as the process remains a matter 
that is agreed between councils and their communities, 
then opposition is likely to be minor. Councils should 
be interested, as they have a direct interest in both the 
9 Communities’ access to government is consequently determined 
by macro political or policy factors – the chief executive of Kaipara 
district, for example, recently noted in a private conversation that 
his council has no diffi culty in attracting departmental staff to meet, 
despite their distance from Wellington. 
10 Despite a range of initiatives to encourage central local collaboration, 
it is interesting that no government agency has so far acknowledged 
local outcomes in their various statements of intent, even though 
a number of councils have used their LTCCPs as a way of 
acknowledging the contribution of central government programmes 
to their local outcomes.
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quantity and quality of central government expenditure 
in their areas, and most should be conscious of the 
contribution to community well-being that can be 
achieved by ensuring that government investment in 
their districts is better targeted. Spending by central 
government agencies in towns and cities is considerably 
greater than the local government contribution, and one 
of the big questions local politicians inevitably face once 
in offi ce is whether or not their community receives its 
fair share of that spending. 
The bully pulpit is one of the core roles of local 
government and councils have become effective 
advocates for their communities, whether opposing 
the closure of rural schools, protecting access to local 
health services, demanding a greater share of road user 
charges or expressing concern at the uneven allocation 
of police numbers. Questions about the quality of 
government expenditure, however, are diffi cult, largely 
due to the lack of accurate information available to local 
decision makers and citizens and the lack of an effective 
local forum to enable trade-offs to be made between 
alternative spending proposals. There is currently no 
mechanism to allow communities to examine the 
relevance of central government spending in localities 
and whether or not that spending addresses local 
priorities and needs. Adapting the LGA 2002 might 
provide the next best opportunity.
Conclusion
The Sustainable Communities Bill represents a largely 
symbolic attempt to redress the centralism of the 
UK state and give practical effect to the new localist 
agenda. Symbolic, because, despite the support of the 
Conservative and Social Democrat parties and a sizeable 
number of Labour MPs, its chances of success, at least in 
its original form, are likely to be slim.11 Yet the call for 
change is not limited to the opposition. Alan Milburn, 
the former health secretary in the Blair government, has 
recently called for local councils to be given the power to 
decide how the National Health Service budget is spent. 
Milburn promotes the idea of the enabling state and a 
‘new politics’ in which people have more control over 
services, and suggests that the ‘masters’ should be ‘local 
communities not Whitehall departments’.12 Milburn 
and the promoters of the Sustainable Communities 
Bill are testament to the strength of the new localist 
agenda, an agenda that has yet to appear in a New 
Zealand political scene. At this point in our history, 
the New Zealand political and policy environment 
lacks any effective champion for a narrative which is 
both fl ax-root focused and citizen-centred. We are yet 
to see the emergence of an equivalent discourse of new 
localism that could seriously challenge our centralist 
orthodoxy. 
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